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5 November 1989*

THE BREAK.
HABERMAS, HEIDEGGER, AND THE NAZIS

Hans Sluga

Edited by Christopher Ocker

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The Break.

Habermas, Heidegger, and the Nazis¹

Hans Sluga

1

What more is there to say about Martin Heidegger and his entanglement with the Nazis? In some form or other the debate about Heidegger's Nazism has been going on since 1945, though in the last two years it has been conducted with new momentum. First came the publication of Victor Farias's controversial book *Heidegger et le Nazisme* in 1987. As a result the French philosophers from A to Z fought over the Heidegger case. Last year several German books on the topic pitched in. Now the contributions of Farias, Derrida, and Lacoue-Labarthe are to appear in English translation. Learned journals as well as the general press have, in the meantime, devoted attention to the issue.

Still there remains plenty to be said on the matter. For instance this: that the debate so far has spectacularly lacked methodological standards. Authors have felt free to vent their spleen against all kinds of things in its course—from their dislike of Heidegger's philosophy to their contempt for Western culture. They have told us that Heidegger was a Nazi, that he became a Nazi in 1930, and that he never gave it a thought before 1933; that he became rector of Freiburg in 1933 in order to prevent the worst, and that for a while he was the willing handyman of the Nazis; that his engagement with Nazism terminated in 1934 or in 1936 or in 1939 or in 1943, and perhaps never; that Heidegger's silence about Nazism after the war was his major failure; that his politics have nothing to do with his philosophy and that his politics have everything to do with it, that *Being and Time* is the source of his political errors, and that his later thought manifests his disengagement from politics, but also that *Being and Time* has nothing to do with Heidegger's politics in 1933 and that it was precisely his turning away from its assumptions that made his political engagement possible.

We are, quite frankly, confused and want to ask which of the many "truths" are really valid. How is one to assess the competing claims? With what eyes are we to look at the

¹The methodological ideas developed in this essay are applied in "Metadiscourse. German Philosophy and National Socialism," *Social Research* 56(1989). The material is elaborated further in *Truth and Power. German Philosophy and the Nazis* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, forthcoming).

fluctuating debate? Posing such questions, we quickly realize that we lack standards, measures, criteria for answering them. Looking for such standards, we are drawn to ask what it means to say that there is or is not a connection between Heidegger's philosophy and his politics. What kind of possibilities should we have in mind? With what conceptual tools should we describe the possible relations between philosophy and politics, between thinking and the exercise of power?

It used to be thought that any up-to-date view of the world would have to deny the efficacy of ideas (philosophical or otherwise). How, after all, could the mind and its products influence events at the level of hard reality? Was the mind not a mere illusion, a halo surrounding the solid facts of the human body, a side phenomenon—and so, from the scientific point of view, too weak to bring about real effects? We have since learned to treat the mind itself as something properly material and to think of ideas as material structures (whether in the brain or outside the body) and to consider the practices involving those structures. The technological environment in which we persist gives us daily lessons in the transforming power of human thought. We know only too well how the most practical and terrifying social and political effects of our industrial world are grounded in mathematical cerebration and how experimentation, invention, and production rely on scientific theorizing which in turn links hands with philosophical speculation. Such observations may give rise to a new myth concerning a linkage of knowledge and power—one that is just as simplistic as the earlier one of the powerlessness of human thought. We now want to see the world itself as a system of power and thought as a manifestation of the will to power.

What we need, however, is a more discriminating account than either myth will allow. We will grant that "truth is not outside power" and that "it induces regular effects of power," but add that there always also persists the possibility of its powerlessness. That powerlessness may reside in the fact that a statement cannot speak out for itself and prove its own truth or significance. A truth cannot attract attention to itself and may thus remain hidden from view though present. Those who recognize it may not possess the standing to give it the hearing it deserves. They may be ignored, ridiculed, and persecuted for their attachment to their ideas; they may be stopped from thinking or promulgating their truth. In the face of power, thought retains a peculiar vulnerability. We will, in other words, have to grant that the relation of knowledge or thought to power is of the most differentiated kind. Some scientific ideas, we realize, have a power of their own sufficient to change the world in which we live. Political ideologies and religious fanaticisms can direct human masses into large-scale social action. The words and feelings of movie stars can move millions. But there are also more private thoughts that lack such efficacy. The power of poetry and philosophy is, at best, subtle and limited.

The relation of philosophy to power has always been ambiguous. For in a number of ways philosophy appears to involve a withdrawal from power and not an engagement with it. (1) Philosophy like so much of human culture is a product of leisure, of time released from the work of necessity. It flourishes only when there is occasion to replace action with reflection, practical involvement with meditation. It demands disengagement and detachment and thus a willingness to uncouple oneself from the daily practice of power. (2) Like all work of freedom, e.g., the pictorial arts, philosophy deals in symbols and signs rather than the things themselves. It replaces physical collaboration and conflict with

dialogue and verbal dispute. However practically minded a philosopher may otherwise be, when he engages in philosophical thinking he must withhold himself, at least temporarily, from nonverbal action. (3) Moreover philosophy, unlike other linguistic arts, practices an abstract use of language—abstract, that is, in the sense of drawn away from the immediate present of the concrete, lived world. Striving for a conceptual, global, "transcendental" understanding of things, it characteristically remains unconcerned with the kind of practical grasp of reality that issues out of and into its control. The theoretical understanding that philosophy has generally offered is, for the most part, useless for the exercise of power. For that reason, philosophy is often charged with irrelevance and indifference to the concerns of actual life. (4) Furthermore, philosophical understanding is in large part a critical enterprise. Philosophy, one might almost say, was born as critique—as critique, for instance, of myth and religious belief, of everyday, common opinion. And it is still most often conceived as a process of criticism rather than as one of the construction of positive insights, of theories, of world views. But criticism is by its very nature secondary and dependent on the objects of its critique, and to that extent infertile, uncreative, and ultimately powerless. (5) Though some philosophers see their goal, like scientists, in the construction of explanatory theories, others go further and see it as the self-overcoming of reflective and theorizing thought. Their philosophy aims at a self-abandonment that reserves no base of power for itself. The undertaking, it is said, when properly understood must issue in philosophical silence, in a return to a simple unreflective concern with life at hand in which no power has been gained through the process of philosophical search and no power is any longer sought out.

Though philosophical practice appears thus in several ways detached from power and its pursuit, there remains nevertheless a peculiar ambiguity in its relation to power. For the very fact that philosophy seems to deny power can be thought to imply a new, more subtle kind of affirmation. To begin with there is power in the very act of withdrawing from what other humans take as necessary or inevitable. In this lies, for instance, the universally-felt power of the monk; for the monk's denial of the body, of possession, of sex, and even of speech signals a mastery not only over the demands of his own body, but over life itself. Insofar as philosophy participates in such monkish ideals—as it does, no doubt, even today in its secularized form—its very denial of power can be seen as a more subtle engagement with it. That paradox is, perhaps, most evident when philosophical reflection reaches the limits of its own language and issues in silence. Where the goal of philosophy is seen as philosophical silence, as an escape from the language games in which our thinking is usually caught, the silence itself can appear as a source of power—of a power palpably felt by those who achieve it in themselves and also by others who may see it as evidence of a self-mastery not wholly of this world.

The ambiguous relation of philosophy to power plays out equally in forms of philosophizing where silence is not considered a relevant ideal. For even where philosophy is understood as critique or as theory, its understanding of itself is peculiarly situated with respect to power. Like all critique, philosophy never has, and perhaps rightly so, the imaginative hold that mythical, productive thinking has over the human mind. And yet criticism is also seen as corrosive and dangerous, as subversive and in need of social control. For it suggests other possibilities and thus directions of change, of reconstruction and revolution. Helpless as critical thought may be, limited as its immediate effects may be, it

is for that reason always perceived as an eminent threat by those who want to establish the necessity of what is in fact only actual, and to whom as a consequence the thinking of other possibilities becomes itself an act of power.

That there is power in actual knowledge we may take for granted, and if philosophy is conceived as a theorizing enterprise we may also grant that there exists in it a source of power. The kind of theories that philosophy generates are, of course, typically of a generality and abstractness that seem to provide no mechanisms for the production, exercise, control, or channeling of power. Philosophical theories (even moral and political theories) are characteristically abstracted apart from immediate significance and social influence. In this way theorizing philosophy participates in the withdrawal from power. But there has persisted always the thought among philosophers and others that at the same time such detachment opens access to deeper sources of power and influence, that the detachment is at most strategic and designed to gather forces at a deeper and more essential level. When philosophy is thus understood as the pursuit of a deep power, its conception may approximate that of magic and alchemy.

On reflection we come to see that the relation of philosophy to politics is at all times peculiarly indirect and broken. Words and actions are at all times detachable from each other. There are logical links that lead from word to word, but none that lead from words to actions. There are causal links that lead from action to action, but none that leads from words to actions. When we think of the relation of the very abstract questions that philosophers regard as their ultimate concern (questions like Heidegger's concerning the analysis of Dasein or the history of Being) to the practical concerns of daily politics, there appears to be indeed the possibility of a two-fold break separating the two. There is first the break between abstract speculation and political philosophy; there seems no easy route that leads from thinking about human existence or the nature of being to a theory of how human beings should organize their daily living together. Speculative thought certainly does not "imply" political theory, since the two are typically cast in diverse vocabularies. There is also a break between political philosophy and concrete political judgment; political philosophy in its generality is too unspecific to generate practical conclusions. We must not, in any case, expect philosophical theories to free us from our political practice; between words and actions there remains the gap already referred to.

Given the indirect and broken relationship between philosophy and politics, our question is how the break between them can be bridged and how have philosophers bridged it. One reason for concerning ourselves with Heidegger and his political engagement is precisely to have a reference point for such a discussion.

2

In what follows I want to organize my thoughts on these matters by focusing on Jürgen Habermas's contributions to the Heidegger debate. Habermas belongs to that post-war German generation which is old enough to have experienced the last phases of Nazi rule. Like many others of his generation, he has felt the need again and again to reflect on the German past. Unlike most German philosophers of his generation, he has also felt it repeatedly necessary to take up the question of Heidegger's Nazism, first in 1953 in a review

of Heidegger's *Introduction to Metaphysics*, next in the framework of his 1984 book *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, and most recently in a far-reaching preface to the German version of the Farias book.

In 1953 Habermas was most shocked by the political references in Heidegger's 1935 lectures (then just published) and particularly offended by Heidegger's talk of the "inner truth and greatness" of National Socialism. In outrage he wrote: "Since those sentences were published for the first time in 1953 without annotation, one must presume that they represent Heidegger's current unchanged opinion" ("Mit Heidegger" 69). The inference was perhaps too hasty, but it brings out what is, in retrospect, most striking in Habermas's essay: that it concentrates so sharply on Heidegger's politics, but largely exempts his philosophy from criticism. In fact Habermas writes: "The philosopher Martin Heidegger concerns us here not as philosopher but in his political radiation, in his influence not on the internal debate of scholars but on the formation of the will of inflammable and enthusiastic students ("Mit Heidegger" 67), and, "Our mode of perception is 'unobjective' in the sense that it focuses not on the objective context of the lectures, but on their physiognomy" ("Mit Heidegger" 72).

There are good biographical reasons why Habermas should have considered the separation of Heidegger's political rhetoric from his philosophy so plausible in 1953. He was himself at the time very much under the influence of Heidegger's thought, having been introduced to it by Oskar Becker (who mediated Heidegger's philosophy also to others like Otto Pöggeler and myself). Following Becker's reading, which tended to de-emphasize the distinction of various phases in Heidegger's thinking, Habermas may have thought it easy to detach Heidegger's politics and philosophy from one another. In any case his review argued that, whereas Heidegger's political rhetoric had changed several times over the decades, always adjusting itself to the demands of the moment, "the meaning structures retain their continuity over decades of development." Habermas, indeed, assumed "the stability of the fundamental categories from *Being and Time* to the letter on humanism" ("Mit Heidegger" 72). Hence, the concluding sentence of the review admonishes us "to think with Heidegger against Heidegger," i.e., with the philosopher and against the political rhetorician.

Habermas's separation of Heidegger's philosophy from his political appeal was too easy to be ultimately satisfactory, since one is immediately led to ask why that philosophy could acquire the political aura which it no doubt had in the 1930's. In *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* Habermas has no more doubts about the interlacing of Heidegger's philosophy with his politics. He now takes Heidegger's failed political engagement as evidence for and, indeed, part of a philosophical failure. The crucial issue is Heidegger's "attempt to step over the threshold to postmodern thought by internally overcoming metaphysics" (131). Habermas is convinced that Heidegger has failed at that self-assigned task. His attempt to overcome the metaphysical presuppositions of modernity is merely external, a mere overturning and inversion of modern thought. And inasmuch as he propagates a mere inversion of the thought patterns of the philosophy of the subject, Heidegger remains caught up in the problematic of that kind of philosophy (160).

Since according to Habermas the critique of modernity is well under way in *Being and Time*, no change in the structure of its philosophy is necessary to make it apply to the political conditions of 1933. All that is required is a new interpretation of it which allows

the shift from speaking about an individual human Dasein, to speaking of Dasein collectively as the Dasein of the German people. Where *Being and Time* had undertaken the philosophical critique of modernity, Heidegger's Nazi engagement may be thought of as drawing its political consequences. We read:

So little did Heidegger perceive the position worked out in *Being and Time*—and elucidated many times in the succeeding years until 1933—as problematic that after the takeover of power he made an original use precisely of the implications, in terms of the philosophy of the subject, of self-assertive Dasein in its finitude. To be sure it was a use that significantly shifted the connotations and the original meaning of the existential analytic. The basic concepts of fundamental ontology were left unchanged but given a new content by Heidegger in 1933 (Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse* 156ff).

Because of the continuity of Heidegger's thought from 1926 to 1933 and because of the internal connection between the philosophical thought and the politics of 1933, his disillusionment with National Socialism eventually forced upon him a philosophical reassessment. Now Habermas no longer argues for an essential continuity in Heidegger's thought from *Being and Time* to the letter on humanism of 1946, as he had done in his review. Following other interpreters, he recognizes a break in Heidegger's thinking sometime between 1930 and 1940 and locates it precisely at the moment of Heidegger's disillusionment with National Socialism. In his eyes the philosophical turn from the early to the later philosophy "is so bereft of plausibility that it cannot be satisfactorily explained in terms of the internal motifs" (Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse* 155). He is convinced that Heidegger could find the way to his later thought "only by way of his temporary identification with the National Socialist movement" (Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse* 155).

Because he identified "Dasein" with the nation, authentic capacity to be with the seizure of power, and freedom with the will of the Führer, and because he had read into the question of Being the National Socialist revolution . . . , an internal and not easily touched up connection between his philosophy and contemporary event was established. A plain, political-moral revaluation of National Socialism would have attacked the foundations of the renewed ontology and called into question the entire theoretical approach. (Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse* 158ff).

Habermas interprets the turn from the early to the later philosophy in the well-known categories of activity and passivity. The characterization of Dasein as *Entschlossenheit* in *Being and Time* is taken to imply an activist morality that subsequently served to justify the political activism of the Nazis. The characterization of truth as the *Geschick* of Being in Heidegger's later philosophy on the other hand, is said to accompany an essentially passive and submissive morality. Heidegger's turn from the early to the later philosophy is interpreted as being at the same time a turn from a position that made his active Nazi engagement possible to one that explains and excuses his political failure. "The language of *Being and Time* had suggested the decisionism of empty resoluteness; the later philosophy suggests the submissiveness of an equally empty readiness for subjugation" (Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse* 141). The later philosophy, so Habermas in 1984, allows Heidegger to minimize the responsibility for his own earlier actions. "That the eyes of the most

resolute philosopher were only gradually opened to the nature of the regime—for this . . . the course of the world itself is supposed to assume authorship . . . Thus was born the concept of the history of Being" (159).

Habermas's new reading of the issue has, no doubt, gained in subtlety since 1953, but several questions remain. I will set them all aside including the doubts one might have about the active-passive schema Habermas (much in tune with the general debate) employs in his account of Heidegger's development from the early to the late philosophy. To discuss them would mean to pay closer attention to the crucial terms of "Entschlossenheit" and "Gelassenheit" and to Heidegger's whole conception of the will and of human action than the interpreters have found necessary until now.

But we need to ask ourselves here at least how the philosophy of *Being and Time* might have allowed Heidegger's shift from a concern with individual existence to one with national destiny. In 1921 Heidegger had been able to write to his student Karl Löwith: "I do what I must and what I consider to be necessary and do it as well as I can—I do not adapt my philosophical work to the cultural needs of an unspecified Today . . . I work out of my own 'I am'" (Löwith 348). That concern with the individual "I" remains central also in *Being and Time*. Dasein is in the first instance for Heidegger in that book "unrelated to Others" (Heidegger, *Being and Time* 156). It reaches authentic being in anxiety and "Anxiety individualizes Dasein and thus discloses it as *solus ipse*" (233). Death is the most authentic possibility for Dasein, and dying is "essentially mine" (297). Heidegger, for that reason, characterizes his own position as an "existential solipsism" (233)—a fully appropriate characterization given the secondary role that *Being and Time* assigns to being with others, caring for others, to the social world as a whole, given indeed Heidegger's almost total and characteristic (and much criticized) neglect of the sphere of politics. The crisis which Dasein must face in its openness is, in *Being and Time*, as yet a merely personal, "inner" crisis, a crisis of conscience of a quasi-religious nature. Heidegger's conception of it is deeply rooted in his own struggle with his inherited religion as well as in his reading of Kierkegaard. What remains to be explained is how such a personal sense of religious crisis can be transformed, in Heidegger's thought in the 1930's, into the idea of political and national crisis.

How, we might want to know, can such a shift be accomplished while retaining unchanged "the basic concepts of fundamental ontology," as Habermas writes in 1984? What does it mean to say that Heidegger only provides us with a new "original use," with a new "interpretation," with "new connotations" of an essentially stable structure? Such questions eventually motivated Habermas's new assessment of the Heidegger case—an assessment he spells out in his preface to the Farias book.

3

That essay deserves our special attention because it represents not only his most recent statement on the matter, but also his most mature, most detailed, and most complex account—and because it raises most explicitly the methodological concerns that motivate my own current reflections. There is much we can agree with in Habermas's assessment of the heuristic standards to be observed in this inquiry, even though at other points his claims

seem to me in need of supplementation and revision. Not surprisingly, what we can learn from the heuristics of this case connects quite naturally with very general concerns of a hermeneutic kind.

In 1988 the question is once more "whether there was an *internal* connection between Heidegger's philosophy and his political perception of the world-historical situation" (Habermas, "Work and Weltanschauung" 436). But now Habermas is no longer convinced of an inner connection between Heidegger's political engagement and the philosophical structure of *Being and Time*. Therefore he postulates that Heidegger's celebrated turning away from the thought of *Being and Time* began already in 1929, though, he grants that process may have been completed only with the letter on humanism of 1946. In *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* Heidegger's turn was seen as beginning with his disillusionment in the Nazi movement; now it is reinterpreted as the source of his engagement with Nazism. After 1929, Habermas is now convinced, Heidegger abandoned his orientation on the standard of authenticity of the responsible acceptance of one's own life history. "This standard is liquidated and along with it the critical moment of *Being and Time* provided by the *individualistic* heritage of existential philosophy" (442). While Heidegger may not yet have abandoned the activist demand for resoluteness, he now relates the analytic of *Dasein* to an analysis of the movement of metaphysical thought conceived in terms of a history of the Fall (from Being). That Nietzsche-inspired vision is given topical significance by ideological motifs in Heidegger's thinking that derive from a scientifically unfiltered diagnosis of the time offered by "Young-Conservative" writers like Ernst Jünger, Oswald Spengler, Ludwig Klages, and Leopold Ziegler.

Habermas now thinks that *Being and Time* may not have provided Heidegger with "a critical potential vis-à-vis Fascism," but he agrees that Heidegger's politics did "not necessarily follow from what was in *Being and Time*" (439). We can only say that *Being and Time* is not incompatible with Heidegger's Nazi engagement. There remains in Habermas's eyes, then, an explanatory gap. He writes:

I would like to close the gap this negative explanation leaves open with the thesis that from around 1929 on, Heidegger's thought exhibits a *conflation* of philosophical theory with ideological motifs. From then on themes of an unclear Young-Conservative diagnosis of the time enter into the heart of Heidegger's philosophy itself. Only then does he wholly open up to the antidemocratic thought that had found prominent Right-wing advocates in the Weimar republic (439).

I believe that Habermas's new emphasis on the distinction between philosophical and ideological elements in Heidegger's thinking is an important step forward. The question of the interlacing of Heidegger's philosophy with his politics will never find clarification unless we succeed first in separating different discursive elements. This is a point I will come back to shortly.

But first it needs to be said that it is crucial for Habermas that the philosophical and ideological elements do not simply sit side by side in Heidegger's thinking. Rather he postulates that a "conflation" between them occurred after 1929, that from that date onward the ideological elements began to "enter into the heart of Heidegger's philosophy." Habermas is, in fact, convinced that even before 1929 and during the writing of *Being and Time* Heidegger may have adhered to ideological beliefs close to those of the Young

Conservatives. Of *Being and Time* he now says: "Naturally the spirit of the times, with which our author was already imbued, shows itself in this central work" (438). But he allows that its achievement is not "impeached" by that fact. "Up to *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* [of 1929], Heidegger's philosophical work is faithful enough to the stubborn logic of his problematic that those portions of it explainable in terms of the sociology of knowledge and relating to the context in which it arose do not prejudice the context of justification" (454). But after 1929, Habermas argues, the already present ideological motifs "came together with a problematic that arose from the uncompleted opus itself, *Being and Time*" (441). The existential analysis of Dasein in that work had given an essentially unhistorical, transcendental characterization of the temporal, historical character of human Dasein. In order to complete his thought, Heidegger from 1930 onwards therefore saw himself forced to attempt a radically temporalized analysis. In this new account the existentials change from basic constitutional features of Dasein into the products of a process coming from afar. Thus there arises in Heidegger's thinking an idealistically deified conception of history not accessible to strict scientific and argumentative examination. "In this domain philosophy rules alone; it can therefore contract a dark alliance with scientifically unexamined diagnoses of the times" (442). "Against this background," Habermas writes,

the acceptance of the rectorship and the rectorial address follow, not only naturally, but by necessity out of Heidegger's rejection of an academic philosophy that 'serves a ground and powerless thinking,' out of his elitist understanding of the German University . . . out of an unrestrained fetishism of the mind and a missionary assessment of the self that allowed him to see the role of his own philosophizing only in the context of an eschatological world destiny (444).

Habermas's new analysis is both differentiated and perceptive, and yet one finds it difficult to accept it as a complete assessment. For the links that he finds between Heidegger's thought and his politics remain tenuous at best. But he is clear on two crucial points. The first is that in order to elucidate the issue, we must consider not only and not primarily the context of *Being and Time* but Heidegger's words from the time of 1933-34 onwards. And the second is that those writings must be read within the historical context of the time. If we find reason to disagree with Habermas's assessment, that is not because of a quarrel over those two points, but rather because both the relevant writings and the relevant time can be understood differently from the way Habermas suggests they must.

4

In 1953 Habermas insisted on a separation between Heidegger's philosophy and his political appeal. By 1984 he had come to convince himself that Heidegger's philosophy and his politics are after all interconnected. He then thought that an internal link between the two was generated by a new interpretation Heidegger adopted from the unchanged structure of the thought of *Being and Time*. In 1989 he finally concluded that Heidegger's politics was internally linked to a philosophy that had replaced that of *Being and Time*—a philosophy that had been shaped by the intrusion of ideological motifs into the philosophical context and that ultimately matured into the doctrine of the history of Being.

Great as the advance in insight may be, one remains unsure of the concepts in which it is cast. How are we to understand the distinction between philosophical and ideological "motifs"? What is meant by the "intrusion" of the latter into Heidegger's philosophical work? What is a "conflation"? What is meant by the metaphor of ideology "entering the heart of Heidegger's philosophy"? Throughout, Habermas operates with an unreflected distinction between the internal and the external. That distinction appears first in 1953 (where it is also called the distinction between the "objective" and the "unobjective"). It is retained in *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* and drawn upon once more in his latest piece. Habermas is, of course, not the only philosopher to employ it in this debate. That whole debate rests, in fact, on its use—sometimes explicitly so, as in Habermas, at other times implicitly. In the end the question is always whether there is merely a contingent link between Heidegger's political actions and his philosophy or a necessary and essential connection. Unfortunately we are forced to admit that the distinction is philosophically unclear. In order to get beyond the merely suggestive power of such talk, one must have a more reflective account of the organization of human discourse.

In the preface to the Farias book Habermas is at least clear on one point which others have confused. For the issue is not to establish a unity of work and person, an internal link, so to speak, between a text and an organism. The "rigorous conception of the unity of work and person," Habermas writes, "seems to me inadequate to the autonomy of thought and, indeed, to the general history of the reception and influence of philosophical thought" (433). Habermas is surely right in thinking that the insistence on such a unity invites a transference of psychological and moral language from person to work. But, so Habermas, "illumination of the political conduct of Martin Heidegger cannot and should not serve the purpose of a global depreciation of his thought" (433). At the same time, Habermas does not want to deny "all internal connection between philosophical works and the biographical contexts from which they come" (433). That concession, unfortunately, muddies the waters again, for what is at stake is not really the connection between a work and a biographical context (whether internal or not) but the link between two kinds of statements that we find Heidegger to have made: one seemingly abstract and philosophical, the other concrete and political. To understand the nature of their relation, it is not enlightening to refer to the fact that they were both made by the same person. If one and the same person says "I like pea soup" and "Man is the shepherd of Being" that establishes no unity between those two statements beyond the fact that they were made by the same person. The same is true when we consider the statements "Man is the shepherd of Being" and "National Socialism is the destiny of the German people." Our question is precisely what linkage (if any) there might be between the two statements beyond the fact that they were both uttered by Heidegger.

I do believe that progress in the discussion over the Heidegger case—progress, indeed, on the much wider question of the multiple and complex relations between philosophy and politics and more generally between verbal thought and the exercise of power—depends on the availability of a satisfactory theory of discourse. And it seems to me particularly important here to draw on the resources of Michel Foucault's analysis of discourses since it is, without doubt, the most worked-out attempt at such a theory.

Of importance here is first of all Foucault's conviction that every discourse is characterized in a fourfold way: by specifying certain objects, certain concepts, certain

strategies of thought, and a certain social field. This analysis allows, then, that every discourse, whether empirical or not, whether philosophical or not, whether true or not, constitutes a content for itself which is defined in terms of objects, concepts, and strategies. At the same time the discourse also defines a social site and hence can be discussed as a social phenomenon.

When we look at Heidegger's words around 1933 with such distinctions in mind we quickly realize that, however closely philosophy and political engagement may have been connected for him at the time, we can identify distinct and separable discourses in his speaking and writing. There is first the philosophical discourse in which he speaks as philosopher or thinker about very abstract philosophical questions; those words, we realize, are not addressed to a general public, but to others familiar with the philosophical debate and specifically with the intricacies of *Being and Time*. There is also another discourse in which the central concern is not philosophy, but the German mission; it is addressed to the students at large, to the professors at large, and to the general public. The distinction between these two discourses is perhaps most evident in Heidegger's rectorial address, where the voice of the philosopher and the voice of the new rector intermingle and yet remain clearly distinct.

To insist that there are two discourses is, of course, not to deny that there are relations between them. It is evident that Heidegger is not speaking schizophrenically through two separate, competing personas. To recognize the distinction is rather very precisely to get a clear focus on the possible link between Heidegger's philosophy and his politics. For in terms of our new description we ought to say that it is the link between two kinds of discourse. We are here concerned with a phenomenon that Foucault himself has only touched on, i.e., what he calls interdiscursive relations. We can say here that in philosophy such interdiscursive relations are often themselves defined discursively, that is, the relation is spelled out in a new and separate set of statements, a new mediating discourse. I call any such mediating discourse a metadiscourse, since it consists always of statements about other discourses. Such a metadiscourse, linking in this case philosophical and political speech, is a discourse of how the break between two forms of speech is to be bridged.

The question of the relation between Heidegger's philosophy and his politics thus becomes redefined as the question of the metadiscourse linking the purely philosophical statements to the political ones. Considering the broken nature of philosophy's relation to political practice, we can more generally say that the link between philosophy and politics is most likely to be everywhere metadiscursive. We can illustrate the point by reference to Plato, who engaged himself both in philosophy and in political affairs. His writings consist of intersecting different discourses concerning the nature of being, of the soul, and of politics. Though the discourses are distinct and remain detachable from one another, they are linked in Plato's own thought through a system of structural correspondences: the structure of reality is said to correspond to the structure of the soul which in turn is thought to correspond to the structure of the properly organized state. These diverse discourses with their homologies are tied together by a metaphilosophical discourse that accounts for the correspondence of the various structures. That interdiscursive discourse is called the theory of resemblance.

Our account allows us to give sharper meaning to the distinction between internal and external links. To say that a connection is internal may mean one of two things. We may want to say by it that it is a connection between elements of one discourse, or we may want to say that it is a connection between elements of two distinct discourses that are interdiscursively connected. If it is correct to say that the relation between philosophy and politics is always interdiscursive, we can begin to understand why the dispute over the question whether Heidegger's politics is internal to his philosophy or not appears to be unresolvable. For in one sense his politics is not internal to that philosophy; they are not part of the same discourse. In another sense they may be called internally related, if there exists an appropriate metadiscourse that interdiscursively links the philosophical and the political discourse.

The question of the relation of Heidegger's politics to his philosophy thus becomes the question of the existence and nature of an appropriate metadiscourse. When we go back to Heidegger's rectorial address we can, in fact, identify such a metadiscourse. In that address Heidegger talks to us not only as philosopher and as rector, but also as "spiritual leader." The speech begins, in fact, with the declaration that "the assumption of the rectorate is the commitment to the *spiritual* leadership of this institution of higher learning" (Heidegger, "Self Assertion" 470). The task of such spiritual leadership is, according to Heidegger, to establish that the political crisis of German life can be resolved only by facing the most profound philosophical questions which had been asked first by the Greek philosophers. It is the discourse of spiritual leadership which is thus called upon to mediate between the philosophical and the political. In so far as this mediating discourse is itself "philosophical" in character, we are no doubt entitled to speak of an internal link between Heidegger's philosophy and his politics. But in so far as that metadiscourse is at the same time-detachable from the philosophical discourse, we are also able to say that Heidegger's philosophy is not inevitably contaminated by his politics.

5

Foucault's analysis of discourse tells us that every discourse has its social site. That is a point which Habermas would surely not want to dispute. But his actual account of the social site of Heidegger's discourse in the 1930's seems to me insufficiently specific. It is useful here to refer to Pierre Bourdieu's *L'ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger*, which argues that any adequate reading of a philosophical text requires from us a sociological *analysis situs*, an examination of the sites from which the discourse is conducted. That means for him in Heidegger's case an analysis of the social space of the age, of the social field of the University, and of the place of the philosophers within it.

In drawing on Bourdieu's account I do not want to suggest that I am ready to accept his claim that Heidegger's philosophy is entirely political in content but philosophical in form. I am here concerned only with his insistence that Heidegger is a thinker who must be read very much within a social context and that this context is not just a general cultural milieu, but also a precisely-defined, disciplinary field. The point that Bourdieu is making here is so important in relation to Habermas's analysis that I will elaborate on some of his conclusions.

The cultural milieu, so Bourdieu, in which Heidegger lived is characterized by the fact that there developed in it a peculiar ideological mood which slowly came to saturate the whole educated bourgeoisie, a metaphysical and political vulgate of which it is difficult to say whether it is the vulgarization of economic and political theories or an independent product of a persistently-autonomous inventiveness. This ideology can be identified, somewhat oversimplified, as a folkish ideology which, however, remained for the most part on this side of speech and cannot be reduced to its linguistic expression. It was a mood and at its base a *habitus*, i.e., a lifestyle and a view of life. Such a *habitus*, so Bourdieu explains his technical term elsewhere, "is a system of shared social dispositions and cognitive structures which generates perceptions, appreciations, and actions" (*Homo Academicus* 279). It is on this *habitus*, this "spirit of the age" drawn from all corners and all kinds of sources that Heidegger, according to Bourdieu, builds his philosophical discourse.

While Heidegger's philosophy is indeed completely locatable in the dimensions of its space and its time, we cannot, however, treat it as a mere and direct expression of an ideology. Bourdieu writes of Heidegger's philosophy: "No problem of the epoch, no ideological answer given to any such problem by the 'conservative revolutionaries,' which is not present in this absolute work, but in a form made sublime and hence unrecognizable" (*Die politische Ontologie* 75). In this sublimation lies also all the difference in the world between Heidegger and the ideologists of the conservative revolution. Heidegger's philosophy "is defined by a space which is not just that of Sombart and Spann, nor that of Jünger, Niekisch, or Möller van den Bruck; it is rather the specific space of the philosophical field" (74). Bourdieu writes: "Just as art imitates art, so philosophy imitates philosophy, and so it is useless to try to understand a philosophical thinking outside the relations of its philosophical field in which it is rooted, in particular such a professorial thinking as Heidegger's, who never stopped thinking of himself in relation to other thinkers—and that, it seems paradoxically, the more so the more he asserted his independence and originality" (80).

Philosophy, we must realize, constitutes a social field of its own. "The entrance into that field implies insertion into its history . . . by means of a knowledge and recognition of its historically generated problematic, an entrance fee that is discretely charged to everyone entering" (78). The relative autonomy of the philosophical field is manifested in the fact that between the ethico-political attitudes that ground the discourse and its ultimate form, "a system of legitimate problems and thought objects" inserts itself (79). In this way the production and the product are subject to a transformation which makes every philosophical position homologous to an ethico-political one, but whose goal is at the same time to make the relation between the end product and its grounding determinants unrecognizable. The philosophical field provides a structure of possible solutions which determines the acceptable forms the ethico-political position can take within the field. The very limited range of those solutions defines the available homologues between the ethico-political content and the philosophical form.

What is the philosophical field in which Heidegger operates? For Bourdieu it is specifically that of a professional philosophy dominated by a beleaguered Neo-Kantianism. Heidegger operates, so Bourdieu, in a field "where all legitimacy emanates from Kant" (8). Heidegger's goal is to break the domination of the philosophical field by the Neo-Kantians. While the Neo-Kantians, men like Cohen and Cassirer, are "the respected heirs of the great

liberal tradition and of the European humanism of the enlightenment" (82). Heidegger's undertaking can be understood as the violent action of a philosophical revolutionary whose aim it is to make a new position influential in the field of philosophy which until then has lacked legitimacy in the context of the University, i.e., that of the conservative revolution. "It is Heidegger who brings about the 'conservative revolution,' the 'new turn' in the field of philosophy" (94).

Bourdieu's distinction between the cultural and political milieu in which Heidegger lived and the disciplinary field in which he operated seems to me of the greatest importance for understanding the interrelation of Heidegger's politics and philosophy. The significance of this point is, in my eyes, in no way diminished by the fact that, unlike Bourdieu, I take that distinction to confirm the idea that we can separate different discourses in Heidegger's body of statements. However, in his preface to the Farias book Habermas suggests quite another line of reasoning. While he considers Heidegger on the background of the social milieu of his time, he has nothing to say about Heidegger's philosophical and political statements on the background of the philosophical field. That seems to me to obstruct a deeper understanding of the meaning of Heidegger's statements. But, it must be said, that Habermas advances a reason for his neglect of the disciplinary context. On his account Heidegger's turning away from the philosophy of *Being and Time* and the intrusion of ideological motifs into his philosophical thinking is accompanied by a break with academic philosophy. Habermas writes that around the year 1929

Heidegger's understanding of his role as a philosopher changed. During his encounter with Ernst Cassirer at Davos (March 1929) he expressed brusque dismissals of the world of Goethe and German Idealism. A few months later, after his July inaugural address as a professor at Freiburg, Heidegger completed the break with his teacher Husserl . . . He seems at that point to have carried out a conscious break with academic philosophy, in order thenceforth to philosophize in another, nonprofessional way ("Work and Weltanschauung" 440).

Against Habermas's account (which thus justifies neglect of the disciplinary field) it must be said that Heidegger never ceased to be an academic philosopher, that he went on to compose and deliver University lectures, that he never stopped confronting his thought with that of the great philosophical thinkers of the past, that precisely from 1933 he readopted some of the philosophical concepts he had previously avoided (such as, in particular the concept of "Geist," as Derrida has pointed out) and that this change in language was accompanied by a new respect for the greatness of German idealism.

In so far as Bourdieu is right in thinking that Heidegger must be read in the context of the philosophical field, it follows that so far the debate over the connection between Heidegger's politics and his philosophy has been too narrowly focused. In order to understand what is at issue in this debate we must then have a grasp of the exact character of the disciplinary field in which Heidegger operated. It is not enough to reflect on Heidegger's writings and biography alone, nor to reflect on them against the background of the whole cultural and political milieu.

What Bourdieu himself tells us about Heidegger's philosophical field is, however, unsatisfactory, though it provides us with some useful ideas about it. Bourdieu's account suffers from the fact that it treats the disciplinary field as essentially unchanging from the

end of the First to the end of the Second World War. It also treats Heidegger's thinking as being of one piece, as if, over a period of twenty years, there had been no significant changes in it. This static picture cannot satisfy us. German philosophy was undergoing important shifts in the period under discussion, and Heidegger's own thinking was following those shifts. We must, in particular, recognize that the political changes in 1933 deeply affected the philosophical field. If we are to understand Heidegger's thinking at that time, we must understand very precisely *how* the disciplinary field was affected by the external, political environment.

When we set out to improve our understanding of those matters, we quickly discover that Bourdieu's characterization of Heidegger's relation to the disciplinary field in terms of a conflict between "the great liberal tradition" as represented by the Neo-Kantians and a revolutionary conservatism made philosophically respectable by Heidegger is far too simple to fit the actual facts. For we then discover that the Neo-Kantians themselves, or at least some of the younger Neo-Kantians, also set out in 1933 to accommodate themselves to the Nazi regime. Under the auspices of the German Society for Philosophy (the "Deutsche Philosophische Gesellschaft") they organized a huge congress in the Fall of 1933 in which they publicly declared their support for Hitler and his Nazi revolution. In the end, the issue with which we are concerned is not simply Heidegger and his political errors. The question is not even simply that of the connections between German philosophy and National Socialism in 1933. The real question is still the peculiar and difficult relation between philosophy and politics.

We are still grappling with an understanding of the break that separates the two domains and with the possibilities of bridging it. Habermas's account, in its methodological innocence, has been important to us in opening up the issue on the example of the Heidegger case. He has shown us that we are not concerned here with the unity of a person, but with the unity or lack of unity of a discourse. He has also convinced us that for all the specific insights he offers us in the Heidegger case, we need to look beyond his work to Foucault's discourse analysis and to Bourdieu's account of social habitus and disciplinary field. To understand the flexible linkage between philosophy and politics means to understand the interdiscursive relations that may obtain between the two and the place of metadiscourses defining those relations in the context of the philosophical field.

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A Response

Mixing Interpretation, Religion and Politics:

Heidegger's High Risk Thinking

Hubert L. Dreyfus

Hans Sluga has wasted no time in cutting through the journalistic chatter surrounding Heidegger's political past and homing in on the real issues raised by Heidegger's support of National Socialism. Since I am in almost total agreement with Sluga's treatment of the question, I will devote only a moment to criticizing the one claim in his paper with which I disagree, and then go on to fill in and develop further some of the important issues raised by Sluga's approach.

Although he disagrees with Habermas on almost every question of interpretation of Heidegger, there is one point on which Sluga, Habermas and the whole German reading of Heidegger's *Being and Time* concur, viz. that early Heidegger is some sort of existential solipsist. There is no doubt a deep confluence of Kierkegaardian and Husserlian individualism in *Being and Time*, but Heidegger gives it an important anti-solipsist twist that descends from Dilthey and is consonant with the later Wittgenstein. To state the matter briefly and therefore rather dogmatically,¹ Heidegger does hold that we are a being that is reduced to an essential unrelated *solus ipse* in anxiety in the face of death, but he is emphatic that this isolated being is not a consciousness, not a self, and has no intelligibility of its own. As a pure "that-it-is-and-has-to-be," it is not even Dasein. Dasein has being-with as one of its existential structures; care as concern and solicitude is the meaning of Dasein; and *Das Man*, the one, is explicitly credited with being the sole source of the intelligibility of everything including the self. After all, if there is one point made over and over again in *Being and Time*, it is that Dasein is being-in-the-world.

For the purpose of today's discussion, setting this point straight serves to focus more clearly just what does and does not change in Heidegger's *Kehre*. The turn is not a substantive shift from an individualistic to a historical understanding of being. True, in his book *Nietzsche*, Heidegger criticizes his earlier "hermeneutic-transcendental questions" as

¹For the argument, see H. Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time Division I* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1991), chapter 14.

"not yet thought in terms of the history of Being,"² but the *Kehre* is thus best understood as a methodological shift of interest from the general, ahistorical structure of the world, to the series of historical worlds that have constituted our history. What Heidegger realized in 1929 or 1930 was that (1) the world or clearing always has a specific content which he calls the truth of being, (2) that *Dasein's* job is receiving various truths of being, and (3) that *the thinker's* job is naming or characterizing the truth of being at each stage of our history.

The stages of that history are already fully spelled out by 1935 in "The Origin of the Work of Art":

In the West for the first time in Greece what was in the future to be called being was set into work, setting the standard. The realm of beings thus opened up was then transformed into a being in the sense of God's creation. This happened in the Middle Ages. This kind of being was again transformed at the beginning and in the course of the modern age. Beings became objects that could be controlled and seen through by calculation. At each time the openness of what is had to be established in beings themselves, by the fixing in place of truth in figure.³

As I understand *Being and Time*, nothing, at least in Division I of that work, needs to be repudiated when Heidegger makes this important turn from the transcendental to the historical. Nor does Heidegger's shift in emphasis from *Dasein's* willfulness to *Dasein's* receptivity have to await his disillusionment with National Socialism as Habermas claims. As we can see in "The Origin of the Work of Art," it coexists already in 1935 alongside Heidegger's recognition of "the inner greatness of the movement," indeed, if we are to accept Heidegger's self-interpretation on this point, and I think we should, the receptivity to the truth of being is simply a concretization of an openness to the understanding of being Heidegger recognized from the start.

The resoluteness intended in *Being and Time* is not the deliberate action of a subject, but the opening up of *Dasein*, out of its captivity in that which is, to the openness of being.⁴

Heidegger's political engagement is made possible not by the *Kehre* alone but by a specific interpretation of the last stage in the history of being, and the very same interpretation of the history of being which leads Heidegger to support Hitler in 1933 provides the ground for his decisive break with National Socialism somewhere between 1935 and 1938. In 1935 Heidegger seems to have thought that National Socialism was the only available way of saving the local and traditional in the face of global technology as exemplified by the Soviet Union and the United States. In 1938 in "The Age of the World Picture,"⁵ he sees technology as a problem of the *West*, and he sees National Socialism, rather than the USSR and the US, as the most dangerous form of what he calls, following

²Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche II*, (Pfullinger: Verlag Gunter Neske, 1961), p. 415.

³Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art", *Poetry, Language, Thought*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 76-77.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁵Martin Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in *The Question Concerning Technology* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977).

Junger, "total mobilization." The Nazi notion of *Weltanschauung* is now criticized as an aspect of representational thinking, as is the idea of the *Volk* as a sort of social subject. Although it is not clear how much of the extreme rejection of National Socialism in "The Age of the World Picture" was written in 1938 and how much was added later, there is enough in the veiled references of the delivered lecture to make it clear that by 1938 Heidegger thought of the Nazis, not as the answer to technology and nihilism, but as its most extreme expression.

This finally gets us to the central question: to what extent was Heidegger's support and then rejection of National Socialism a personal mistake compounded of conservative prejudices, personal ambition, and political naivete, and to what extent was his engagement dictated by his philosophy? To answer this question we have to follow Sluga's suggestion and go beyond journalism and even factual history to an analysis of the *content* of Heidegger's later philosophy. We need to understand two central theses: what Heidegger means when he speaks of truth setting itself to work, and what he thinks is wrong with our current technological/nihilistic culture.

Truth is set to work by a work of art. A work of art is an object with a special function. In Heidegger's language it is "a being in the Open . . . in which the openness takes its stand and attains its constancy."⁶ The Open for Heidegger is the world of a culture. It is a space opened up by a particular understanding of what it is to be a thing, a person, an institution, etc., in which something can show up *as* something. This shared understanding of the meaning of being is in the practices of a people and need not, indeed, cannot, be captured as a set of beliefs. It can, however, be manifest in an object such as a temple, an epic, a painting, etc. Such a work of art unifies and focuses for the people what they are already up to.

When a work of art functions in this way—when an art work works, Heidegger would say—it transforms the practices it manifests. "It gives to things their look and to men their outlook on themselves."⁷ What Heidegger has in mind here can best be understood by comparing the function of a work of art with the role in science of what Thomas Kuhn calls a paradigm. A paradigm, according to Kuhn, is a perspicuous example of what all members of a scientific community agree is a good way of posing and solving problems. Scientists are socialized into the community by training them to do work which is similar to the work manifested in the paradigm. They thus learn how to act in accord with one another, to come to share agreements in judgments, etc., without being able to make explicit—Kuhn says without being able to rationalize—what is essential about the paradigm and what counts as similarity to it.

Heidegger's work of art might be regarded as a cultural paradigm, and the fact that the paradigm can never be rationalized but only imitated gives rise to what Heidegger calls the struggle between earth and world. For Heidegger a working art work tends to make all relevant practices clear and coherent—this is its world aspect. But at the same time it exhibits a resistance to clarity and totalization—this Heidegger calls "showing forth the earth." The work of art shows what is at stake in the culture but also shows that this "ground" cannot be made explicit and brought under control. This tension sets up a conflict

⁶Ibid., p. 61.

⁷Ibid., p. 43.

of interpretations which is a fruitful struggle that generates the culture's history. Heidegger then generalizes the notion of a cultural paradigm from a work of art to any being in the clearing that can refocus and so renew cultural practices. There are, he tells us, several ways besides art works

in which truth establishes itself in the beings it has opened up. . . . Another way in which truth occurs is the act that founds a political state. Still another way in which truth comes to shine forth is the nearness of that which is not simply a being, but the being that is most of all. Still another way in which truth grounds itself is the essential sacrifice. Still another way in which truth becomes is the thinker's questioning, which, as the thinking of being, names being in its question-worthiness.⁸

One can recognize in this quotation an allusion to the covenant of God with the Jews and the crucifixion, but it is the act that founds a state which concerns us here. We will return to this point in a moment.

The other major preoccupation of the later Heidegger is the danger of the technological understanding of being—the current and last stage of the history of being in the West. What is of note here is that Heidegger thinks there is a more dangerous situation facing modern man than the technological destruction of nature and civilization. The threat is not a *problem* for which there can be a *solution* but an ontological condition. Heidegger's concern is the human distress caused by the *technological understanding of being*, rather than the destruction caused by specific technologies. Consequently, Heidegger distinguishes the current problems caused by technology—ecological destruction, nuclear danger, consumerism, etc.—from the devastation that would result if technology solved all our problems.

What threatens man in his very nature is . . . that man, by the peaceful release, transformation, storage, and channeling of the energies of physical nature, could render the human condition . . . tolerable for everybody and happy in all respects.⁹

What emerges from these two important Heideggerian preoccupations is the basically Christian or post-Christian character of Heidegger's later thought. It is not just that we are receptive to understandings of being and that each specific world disclosing is never fully understood by us nor under our control, although both these religious themes constantly do recur in Heidegger's thought. Seeing this could lead to *Gelassenheit* but not overcoming nihilism. To overcome nihilism, Heidegger, like Charles Taylor and Robert Bellah more recently, holds that we require some shared meaningful concerns that give our culture a focus and enable us to resist dispersion and acquiescence in a state that has no higher goal than to provide material welfare for all. According to Heidegger our deepest need will only be satisfied and our distress overcome when our culture gets a new center. Our current condition is defined by the absence of a god:

The era is defined by the god's failure to arrive, by the 'default of God.' But the default of God . . . does not deny that the Christian relationship with God lives on in individuals and

⁸Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," pp. 61-62.

⁹Martin Heidegger, "What are Poets for?", *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 116.

in the churches; still less does it assess this relationship negatively. The default of God means that no god any longer gathers men and things unto himself, visibly and unequivocally, and by such gathering disposes of the world's history and man's sojourn in it.¹⁰

This is what Heidegger wants to call attention to in his last interview when he says, "Only a god can save us."

Heidegger's *personal* mistake comes from having thought that Hitler or National Socialism was such a god; his *philosophy* is dangerous because it seeks to convince us that only a charismatic figure or some other culturally renewing event can save us from a final fall into contented nihilism. Heidegger's thinking opposes to the Enlightenment a nonmetaphysical version of the Christian message that man cannot be saved by bread, autonomy, maturity, equality and dignity alone.

One direction to go at this point would be to try to figure out what criteria one could use in testing a new charismatic leader or movement before giving it our allegiance. That way we could hope to avoid making such an obviously wrong move as Heidegger's political dedication to Hitler. Heidegger in fact offered such criteria in "The Origin of the Work of Art" in 1935. He notes that the world set up by the art work must respect the earth, i. e., it has to set up and even encourage resistance to totalization. But he does not heed his own warning, or rather he presumably reinterprets earth to bring it close to some sort of sublimated version of Nazi irrationalism and localism. This just shows what Heidegger and Wittgenstein both stress, that rules and guidelines must always be interpreted, so that if one opts for the charismatic one cannot avoid the risk.

But that is not the issue for tonight's discussion. Here it is more appropriate to follow Sluga in asking the methodological question: What sort of claim is Heidegger making from within the philosophical field when he tells us that Enlightenment bread and dignity are not enough, that truth must be newly established, and that only a god can save us. How can one justify or criticize such claims?

Habermas has a simple and, I think, viciously circular response. Such stories about the failure of the Enlightenment can only be taken seriously if they are based upon the results of objective science—Enlightenment science. Otherwise they can only be self-interested, ideological pronouncements. Nietzsche and Heidegger seem to Habermas examples of the dangers of discourse "unfiltered by any knowledge of the social sciences."¹¹ Since such thinking is not self-critical, it can only be arbitrary and dogmatic. Thus Habermas pictures later Heidegger as "beyond argumentation itself"¹²—"a thinker with a privileged access to truth,"¹³ listening uncritically to the call of being and giving out authoritarian pronouncements.

Since Habermas, however, grants that Heidegger's great achievement is to show us the phenomenon of *Welterschliessung*—world-opening—he would have to admit—and did admit when we debated the point in Frankfurt—that to think about such a world-opening

¹⁰Ibid., p. 91.

¹¹Jürgen Habermas, "Work and *Weltanschauung*: The Heidegger Controversy from a German Perspective," in *Heidegger: A Critical Reader*, edited by H. Dreyfus and H. Hall, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 188.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

can hardly be to report one's private state of mind, nor can it be to make objective statements which correspond to the facts, since there are facts only relative to a particular world. After much discussion of this point we agreed that discussion of the current meaning of being would require an interpretive discourse similar to that of art criticism rather than the discourse of objective knowledge or moral critique.

But, as we have seen, Heidegger does not just *interpret* our current world, he *judges* it profoundly lacking. What kind of claim is Heidegger making when he reads our current condition as the absence of a god and our current sensibility as distress in the face of this absence—for only such a reading of the present age justifies risking commitment to some new cultural paradigm?

The first answer we might try to give is that Heidegger is offering a genealogical interpretation. He will focus on and augment our distress and show that it can be accounted for by telling a story of the progressive narrowing and leveling of the understanding of being in our history. Such an interpretation has to make sense of more details than any rival interpretation and ultimately it must convince us by the illumination it casts on our current condition, especially some sense of ontological distress or emptiness. Such interpretive discourse would have to be judged by interpretive standards, even if it is homologous to discourse in the political field that must be judged by political standards.

But how could we know that whatever distress we feel was due to the absence of a god rather than personal and social problems? One answer might be that we will just have to wait for the perfected welfare state and then see. If Habermas and his Enlightenment allies are right, distress will be eliminated, whereas Heidegger, one might suppose, would expect that, as technology succeeds, the suffering will grow. But Heidegger does not make this claim. Heidegger admits and fears the possibility that everyone might simply become healthy and happy. At this point a hermeneutic of suspicion such as Søren Kierkegaard introduces in the *Present Age* and Heidegger adopts in Division II of *Being and Time*, would argue that the happiness must be motivated by, and a sign of, a repressed distress. But it is, precisely, this sort of hermeneutics of the repressed which Heidegger wisely gave up along with the term "hermeneutics" after his turning. All Heidegger can say is that such a forgetting of being would be the darkest night. Only now, and only as long as he can awaken our distress, will we be able to see the force of his interpretation.

Such thinking is far from the "infallible knowledge"¹⁴ Habermas thinks Heidegger claims. Indeed, Heidegger goes out of his way to point out that we can claim no authority or infallibility. He writes to a student that: "In this thinking, the chance of going astray is greatest. This thinking can never show credentials such as mathematical knowledge can. But it is just as little a matter of arbitrariness."¹⁵ He then goes on to repeat his reading of the West:

The default of God and the divinities is absence. But absence is not nothing; rather it is precisely the presence, which must first be appropriated, of the hidden fullness and wealth

¹⁴Jürgen Habermas, p. 203.

¹⁵Martin Heidegger, "The Thing," *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 184.

of what has been and what, thus gathered, is presencing, of the divine in the world of the Greeks, in prophetic Judaism, in the preaching of Jesus.¹⁶

And he immediately adds: "I can provide no credentials for what I have said . . . that would permit a convenient check in each case whether what I say agrees with 'reality.'"¹⁷ And he concludes: "Any path always risks going astray, leading astray. To follow such paths takes practice in going. Practice needs craft. Stay on the path, in genuine need, and learn the craft of thinking, unswerving, yet erring."¹⁸ Whether to follow is left up to each of us.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 186.

¹⁸Ibid.

Minutes of the Colloquy of 5 November 1989

The Participants

Paul Alpers	University of California, Comparative Literature
Paul Bawley	Graduate Theological Union
Hal Childs	Graduate Theological Union
John Coolidge	University of California, English
H. J. Bernard Combriate	University of Stellenbosch
Hubert J. Dreyfus	University of California, Philosophy
Otto E. Guttentag	UCSF Medical Center, Medical Philosophy
Forrest Hartman	The Graduate Theological Union, Center for Theology and Natural Science
Hans-Peter Krüger	Academy of Science, Berlin (GDR)
Babette Jackson	University of California, Education
Bruce Jackson	University of California, Education
James Jarrett	University of California, Education
Martin Jay	University of California, History
Steven Knapp	University of California, English
Thomas Leahy	Graduate Theological Union, Jesuit School of Theology
Leo Lowenthal	University of California, Sociology
Lewis Mudge	The Graduate Theological Union, San Francisco Theological Seminary
Tom Pearson	Graduate Theological Union, Jesuit School of Theology
Dawn C. Riley	University of California, Education
T. Rosenmeyer	University of California, Classics
Daryl Schmidt	The Graduate Theological Union, Pacific School of Religion
Sandra Schneiders	Graduate Theological Union, Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley
Hans Sluga	University of California, Philosophy
Herman C. Waetjen	The Graduate Theological Union, San Francisco Theological Seminary
Wilhelm Wuellner	The Graduate Theological Union, Pacific School of Religion

The Discussion

SLUGA: Bert Dreyfus and I don't disagree all that much. He concentrates very much on the case of Heidegger, on the question of Heidegger's philosophy and his politics, whereas for me that is one case among several others. I am more interested in the question of German philosophy and National Socialism, and Heidegger figures as only one person in that story. Here I am concerned about the methodological issues, about how one should look at these questions: what it means to talk about the relationship between philosophy and politics, how philosophy and politics might be thought to be connected—or disconnected—from each other. I was trying to make some methodological points in my paper, and Bert has not taken those up.

KNAPP: I admire both the paper and the response, but my question will be more directly concerned with the methodological issues raised by Professor Sluga's paper than with the specific observations about Heidegger's views in Professor Dreyfus's response. (I suppose there are many here who would want to speak in more detail about the Heidegger case itself, and I don't mean to push the whole discussion in the more abstract direction implied by my question.) I was attracted to the particular way in which Professor Sluga handled the Foucaultian analysis of discourse as a way of diversifying discourses rather than, as it often becomes in literary critical studies, a way of—to use Habermas's questionable metaphor—conflating discourses. As I think Professor Sluga points out, that metaphor is very problematic, and it is really at the heart of his methodological concerns to call into question the simplicity of any notion of conflating two discourses with different social locations, with differing histories. It is often the case, I think, that Foucault is making it all too easy to effect a transition from literature to something going on outside it, and vice versa. And so I was attracted to this alternative use of Foucaultian analysis. The question I want to raise does not reflect any desire to attack that methodological point. But I do want to raise what I think is a question that will occur to many who might be made nervous by the ease with which this can turn into an apologetic response to almost any kind of critique of an ideology, especially one that, like Nazism, involves a wide range of social practices.

I might put the question—crudely—like this: suppose instead of diversifying discourses by distinguishing the discourse of the discipline of philosophy from the discourse of the discipline of politics, one turned to other areas of German society in the period and applied the same kind of methodological principle to the discourse of arms manufacturing, or to the discourse of medical research, or the discourse of anthropology, or paleontology. I'm thinking of various discourses which might have seemed to have been infiltrated by a Nazi ideology. Isn't there a danger, if one multiplies the various ways in which one could distinguish any given statement from a Nazi ideology, that there would be very little left to

the social location of Nazism itself? In other words, the question that might be raised at that point is what happens to the notion of ideology, what happens to the notion of Nazism as an ideology, if everyone is simultaneously operating within several different discursive communities, so that any given statement might turn out to be either a direct expression of Nazi ideology or answering to some other disciplinary pressure? Is that question too abstract as stated?

SLUGA: I certainly am motivated by questions that go very much further in the direction that you suggest. What lies behind my argument is, maybe, a distrust in concepts. Firstly, the concept of the unity of the human person, and secondly, distrust in the concept of the unity of thought, of knowledge, of belief. In fact, I want to see both persons and belief systems as being disrupted and disunited, as involving breaks and discontinuities at all points. So the concern is always to point out the diversity of these formations, that they are not really single structures at all, that one must use a finer microscope to see that there are these different layers that overlap each other.

But to recognize that doesn't mean to say that these structures aren't connected with each other. When I went over the paper again today, I felt I hadn't said enough about these interconnections. Of course, the whole idea of my reference to the notion of interdiscursive relations and the notion of metadiscourse that I sketched—only really in a short way—was supposed to give some indication that there are ways in which such discourses are, nevertheless, linked. So to recognize them as diverse doesn't mean that one can't at the same time recognize them as being connected with each other. I thought that by recognizing the diversity, by recognizing these various discourses, one could at least raise the question of the kinds of connections there might be, more precisely. If one thinks of human thought being as a unity or the thinking of an individual being as a unity, then one has to start by trying to define displacements. One should recognize first the discontinuities and then begin to ask how these discontinuities get breached. What kinds of additional concepts are needed to get one from one level of discourse, from one level of thinking to another.

KNAPP: It seems to me that the way you put it suggests perhaps a clearer way of asking the question with which I was struggling a moment ago, which would be to say, I take it, that someone suspicious of this way of responding to the debate about Heidegger—or to other debates about intellectual figures who have a tangled past in this way—someone suspicious of that would say, "yes, there is a meta-language that negotiates between politics and philosophy, and that meta-language is itself Nazism," that is, is itself the ideology of Nazism or is itself fascism. What we're faced with is two different notions of where ideology is located. Your suggestion is that if there were different ideologies in various disciplines, then there is a meta-language that one can appeal to in order to describe the relation between separate disciplines and perhaps define points of connection. What I am suggesting is that unless that meta-language is provided by the ideology that's being criticized, the suspicion would be that there's no way of making any total judgment. If you want to criticize the society in a total way, you do so precisely by saying that there is indeed a meta-language that puts together all these different discourses. And that's what Nazism was; it was a way of getting from philosophy to politics to military policy to industrial

policy—putting all those things together. So it's not as if one needs a further language outside all that to unify it. It was already unified and that was the problem. That's what fascism was; that's what Nazism was.

Now I'm not actually endorsing that critique which someone might make of your paper—suggesting that it deprives us of the means of judging this ideology by subordinating this ideology in separate discursive fields that can then be unified by a meta-language, a metadiscourse that is not itself a fascist discourse or Nazi metadiscourse.

SLUGA: Well, when you have such a bridge discourse that allows transitions from one way of speaking, one set of concepts, to another, then of course the question is always: to which discourse does that bridge belong? You can think of it as belonging either to one side of the bridge or to the other. Surely in that sense you might say it belongs to the ideology. What I'm concerned with in the case of Heidegger, and I tried to illustrate this with respect to some other German philosophers, is that they define this metadiscourse—the justification, in other words, for stepping into that arena—they define that essentially in philosophical terms, and you have the conception of the role of the philosopher which is much more general than any case of the fascist conception of the role of the intellectual. It's certainly more pervasive in the history of philosophy. It is one of the forms of self-limitation of philosophy as being disciplined or grounded discipline, a discipline which decides on basic values in situations of ultimate crisis, and these are understandings which philosophers maintain outside this political context.

So in some sense you can say that Heidegger's philosophy together with these claims to intellectual leadership in this particular historical climate can, indeed, bring about these political effects. Another philosophy can also bear very similar political fruits in this context. My research has been very much concerned with trying to ferret out other philosophers—and it turns out they reach similar conclusions.

KNAPP: My conclusion then would be that you are making what amounts to a very powerful critique of the notion of ideology itself. That is, it's the role played by the philosopher that enables quite conflicting sets of beliefs to have the same political outcome. It seems to me that ideology is demoted from its position of central importance as an explanatory instrument here. I mean, it's not that we can say that philosophy ideologically fits together with this politics here. On the contrary, the notion of ideology is now fractured. From a Marxist perspective it would seem that ideology is being given short shrift. I'm actually sympathetic with that, but it seems to me that issue needs to be foregrounded.

JAY: I have some difficulty with what seems to be the move towards isolating the philosophical as a discursive site which is—to a certain extent—pure and unsullied by external intrusions. It seems to me that you are perhaps accepting too much of the terms of the individuals involved—their own self-image—the image of the philosopher only interested in truth, only interested in the large fundamental questions. And in so doing you are failing to see what Foucault always argued, which is that disciplinary boundaries and the self-images of the individuals involved are insufficient to explain what the discursive site is. In a way you're accepting a Weberian notion of wearing two hats—that you can be a

philosopher, social scientist, scholar over here believing in pure *Wissenschaft*, and then be a politician over there, and not have the two intertwine. What we have in the case of Heidegger is perhaps not something that is external, but that can be construed as related to the philosophical tradition out of which he comes, as part of the professional deformation of that particular social site.

I would also want to question your pea soup analogy, which seems problematic. You drew a parallel between the preference for pea soup and for philosophical or political positions, and claim there is no linkage. And then you talk about a linkage that is equally adventitious or contingent between philosophical and political statements. But the taste for pea soup is simply a personal preference. It is, "I like the soup", not an argument that pea soup is a good thing for mankind.

The other claims are close to what Kant meant by aesthetic judgments. They are not personal preferences but warranted assertions that every human being should accept. And, therefore, when a philosopher makes those latter types of statements, he or she is doing more than simply expressing a taste for soup.

SLUGA: Well, let me get to the pea soup first. Surely, I'm not denying that the linkage between Heidegger's philosophy and politics—to stick to that case—is much closer than his likes and dislikes in food are to his philosophy. But my point was to say that nothing is explained by saying it was the same person—the unity of the person—that holds these two judgments together. It's not enough to say: well, it's the same Heidegger who said these two things. You're not explaining anything by this, you're only saying it is that same person who said it. But when we are looking for a linkage between Heidegger's politics and philosophy, we are looking for something more than that. That's what the contrast between the two cases was supposed to indicate. And with the pea soup case, we don't really think there was a relevant linkage except for the fact that it is the same personal setting; and in the second case we do think there is a relevant linkage, but it's not just that the same person said it; the question is: what is needed to make it a relevant linkage? I put that more as a problem, not a solution of one. I think that people don't wear just two hats; they wear many hats, and they put them on and off. There is something, maybe, like a compartmentalization of belief that I accept. We speak in many voices. I recognize the problem; I want to identify the problem.

Now back to this first question. I'm not trying to excuse Heidegger. I'm trying to establish moral consideration. There is a kind of moral outrage in this debate which seems to me deceptive and misleading, because I certainly do think that there are connections between philosophy and politics. Just last week I was reading Bertrand Russell. He was trying to define the role of philosophy, and one of the things he said struck me as very characteristic of his position: philosophy must be concerned only with those things which are absolutely general, absolutely *a priori*. Therefore, philosophy must really set aside any sort of religious, ethical or historical considerations, and cannot be concerned with anything which exists in time and space. It can't really be concerned with human history, either. Now according to this, philosophy attempts to spell out certain very general *a priori* conditions of the possibility of human knowledge, of the deep, ultimate substructure of reality. It tries to transcend particular limitations. What I have argued is that Heidegger, at times, speaks to such issues. He does address such issues, and the problem for him is

certainly that there is a linkage between these very general things and his politics. He says in 1935 that his national socialism comes out of his understanding of human affairs. He himself believes in that linkage, but the question is, what kind of linkage can it be? How do you get from some very general claims about the nature of reality to politics? And my answer is: you don't get to it by some continuous argument. There are steps there, and what you have to explain is the height of the steps, how radical the step is, how that step is, nevertheless made.

JAY: But surely this is not a Foucaultian approach, because Foucault would never accept the original concept that philosophers would only talk about eternal matters that are ahistorical. His position was always that a particular discourse has a very discrete historical "situatedness." Although people have pretenses to universality, they are obviously in a very concrete discourse different from others. Heidegger may have understood that he was able to transcend this situation, but from the Foucaultian point of view, you can't take Heidegger at his word.

SLUGA: Well, I feel totally free with Foucault's work. I don't feel I have to buy all of it or none of it. I can pick and choose what fits together in my own thinking. So I'm not trying to do justice to Foucault—he has to speak for himself. I don't want to say that philosophers—like Aristotle—are really always thinking only about their social context. I do want to imagine that there is a gradation here between explicitly thinking about social conditions—as Aristotle did at times—and also thinking at certain times about much more general matters. Now whether they succeed at either of these levels—political or general matters—that's at least how they see themselves. What I am claiming is that these different levels of speaking are continuously related to each other.

WUELLNER: I have a similar concern. Must one not place German philosophy and the philosophical disciplinary field in the institutional setting of state-controlled and state-approved universities in which German philosophy operates, as distinct from English philosophy with privately-controlled institutions which you don't have in Germany? And isn't that one of the bridge links you're looking for, how to get from the general philosophical to the political? Does not the institutional framework within which philosophers operate determine expectation?

SLUGA: I agree completely with that, and I also think that I try to spell that out in these other pieces I've been working on. For instance, it is important to note that there were whole groups of philosophers who thought quite differently from the philosophical establishment of Heidegger and others, such as the Marxists and the Positivists, but they were in some sense disenfranchised by the German system. The Positivists had their stronghold in Vienna, not in German universities. The Marxists typically were not philosophy professors—for good historical reasons. I think one cannot set that aside. When one looks at the philosophical field, one has to look at how that field is established.

WUELLNER: But you don't do that.

SLUGA: I don't do that? Well, not because I don't think it's important, but because that's not what I'm focused on.

WUELLNER: But aren't you looking for the bridge links in getting from the philosophical/general to the political/specific?

SLUGA: What I get at—and Bert sketched it here in his essay—is the problematic of how the philosophical field is intellectually defined in this period? And I say that that is indeed an important question. But when one views it the way Bourdieu does, one sees neo-Kantian, liberal, value philosophy on the one side and Heideggerian philosophy as a kind of conservative-revolutionary trying to demolish this dominant system of philosophy on the other hand. Neo-Kantianism was already on the point of collapse anyway. It was going downhill. There were now very many different, competing schools, so that at this moment in 1933 when the Nazis come to power we have a number of different philosophers competing for dominance within the philosophical field. They also used that moment to advance their own cause within the field and in Germany as a whole. Maybe Heidegger was not a man eager to submit himself to National Socialism but rather eager to submit National Socialism to his own will. He's also not the only philosopher who had that agenda. I would agree that they were all deeply deceived in thinking that this was even an option. But that's how they saw themselves.

JARRETT: I was very much struck by your mentioning Bertrand Russell in this respect, that is to say a philosopher who makes a pretty sharp distinction between what he thinks of as strictly philosophical and what he thinks are a number of opinions about politics and education, marriage and morals, and so on—not thinking that there is any obligation on his part to make those connections from the one to the other. On the other hand, I suppose we could easily cite a number of philosophers from Hegel to Dewey who do want always to come up with those connections that are fairly definite and specific and who would be willing to defend them. I wonder whether in Heidegger's case it isn't still different; however much he might have said at some point or another, he saw a connection between his philosophy in general and his political position at one particular time. The fact that he had not developed a political philosophy, that he had *not* really come out with a social position might then raise the question in our minds of whether there is much of a connection at all. Was this not in large measure a naive view that he might well have been carried away to adopt and feel that there is some connection with his philosophy but never really *made* it and so the two remain largely disjunct? Is that feasible?

SLUGA: Yes, I certainly don't think that the issue of the relation between philosophy and politics can be answered in a summary fashion; one needs to give a very definite account. It's a very diverse picture we're looking at in Heidegger's case. I do think that if I start, let us say, with Hegel's logic and end up with the philosophy of right that one would have trouble tracing a continuous line from the beginning of the logic to the conclusion of the philosophy of right—there are many discontinuities on the first pages of Hegel's logic already. I do believe that philosophers believe all the time that there are these continuities of thought. The doctrine of the unity of thought is itself a deeply philosophical and

pervasive doctrine that has dominated Western thought for so long. What I find important is that Foucault has offered us a way out of that—a different way of thinking, primarily and essentially different from having us continually defining continuity of thought. Unity of thought is never scientifically defined—it's always taken for granted.

HARTMANN: In Professor Dreyfus's paper is he, in essence, saying there *is* that continuity you're talking about in Heidegger?

SLUGA: I suspect he believes that. Maybe you should ask him.

HARTMANN: Given that he may believe that—let's speak for him—would you disagree with him or would you see more tension there than he sees? How would you respond to him relative to that?

DREYFUS: What continuity do I see?

SLUGA: The unity in Heidegger's thought.

DREYFUS: The unity?

HARTMANN: Between his politics and his philosophy. That is, that there is some kind of inner dynamic in the philosophy which drives him to the instantiation of his philosophy.

DREYFUS: Well, I think that it shouldn't have driven him where it did. There is a big discontinuity between saying, in "The Origin of the Work of Art," that we need some kind of charismatic solution, and choosing the charismatic solution he chose—I don't see that following at all. But it certainly is a premise of his position that we are in a kind of nihilism that needs a charismatic solution.

HARTMANN: So it does not surprise you that he becomes political; it does surprise you that he becomes political in this way?

DREYFUS: Yes, from within his philosophy. Knowing his background, however, it's not surprising.

HARTMANN: And so Professor Sluga, are you finding more tension than Professor Dreyfus would find?

SLUGA: Well, the trouble with these discussions is that they slowly leave you with tables unguarded; you become more and more denuded here and have to show yourself in your true light. To get down to my *real* doubt: it's ultimately with the notion of logical consequence, with the idea that thoughts follow by some anonymous or necessary logical necessity from each other. Would this mean that you can't say anything else of an idea that follows from it? And in some sense, that's true, you can't. But it doesn't mean that you can't spell out systems of logic. What it does mean is that in the applied case, when you're

dealing with the nature of argumentation, it is always possible for the inference to be defeated. All actual logical reasoning is the same: such and such follows by necessity. That claim is defeasible because it depends simply on what the two assertions look like. In reality it also depends on what you say is the true or real meaning. The question of meaning and the question of inference are linked. And so when one person claims that B follows from A, and another person claims that B does not follow from A, then one way of putting that is to say that obviously they are using some of their words with different meanings. Meaning develops and grows, and the speakers themselves will go out and redefine and redetermine what they really meant, and hence in that sense—I'm almost tempted to say that no proposition follows from any other proposition: Heidegger's political conclusions can't follow, in a sense, from Heidegger's more abstract philosophical statements. This doesn't mean that Heidegger didn't say they followed; for him it may have followed. It means that for us it needn't follow. We are free to redetermine these concepts so that they do not follow.

DREYFUS: I don't think I ever mentioned any *premises* from which Heidegger drew his conclusions. I said there are certain very fundamental claims he makes which I interpreted as descriptive claims. One of them is: "We're in nihilism." Another is: "We need a charismatic figure to get us out." That isn't supposed to follow logically from anything. That's why he says he could be wrong.

WAETJEN: Could you test this problem of continuity or discontinuity in another way? You referred to other German professors during the Nazi era who also related themselves to Nazi ideology but who represented different philosophical positions. What about German philosophers who *did* recognize what Nazism was, who had perspicacity and whose philosophy may have contributed to that perspicacity? Are there any like that with whom you are familiar on the other side, so to speak?

SLUGA: One could look at a number of philosophers here. I'm not denying that philosophical thoughts can contribute to your views in other matters. What you need to explain is exactly how it happened in each case.

LOWENTHAL: If you take this galaxy of our German colleagues under the Nazis, it is very hard to say about any of these philosophers that there is any inner logic which would plausibly lead to Nazi ideology. The case of Heidegger is unique. There were a few of us in 1927-29 who were suspicious of the philosophical properties in Heidegger's work leading to possibly most dangerous political implications. Nobody would have thought of that with regard to these other philosophers. What always bothers me in all these passionate discussions about Heidegger is that there is obviously a stimulus in Heidegger's philosophy which at least allows us to ponder the question of the connection between Nazi ideology and his philosophy, and you cannot simply dismiss in terms of discourse and metadiscourse the connections which Heidegger himself made in this respect between political attitude and philosophical attitude. And that would be totally impossible with these other men.

SLUGA: Well, I am not so sure it is impossible with these other men. The problem with them is that they are all less interesting as philosophers and as politicians. I think you might look at Max Wundt who was mostly a historian of German philosophy and who wrote quite respectable pieces on Fichte, and so on, and ended up writing this wonderful book *German Philosophy Explained out of Race and Tribe* in which he shows pictures of various German philosophers and analyzes their heads and derives the main principles of their philosophy from the shape of their heads. So, it ends up in this rather disastrous, strange, racist ideology. And still you can see how he gets from one to the other, from the historical concern all the way to Nazi ideology. At least the picture that Heidegger presents to us before 1933 is rather ambiguous at best. Most people would not read it as a political philosophy.

SCHNEIDERS: I'm having a bit of difficulty with the level at which this discussion is situated. I can certainly follow your argument that if one speaks simply of realms of discourse, one can argue for complete discontinuity among these realms. But is that the way people function, particularly people who are passionate about something like the ultimate questions of what it means to be a human being and what counts as real and important? When you say this person is simply wearing different hats, to me that doesn't get very far beyond the "pea soup" argument. Do people function—I'm not talking whether they carry on discontinuous academic discourses—but do people, if they are even semi-integrated individuals function in totally discontinuous realms? I'm perplexed about why people are raising questions *now* about individuals who were Nazis? Why did von Karajan refuse to discuss his involvement in Nazism? Why do people constantly go back and insist that his Nazi connections have something to do with music? Certainly, politics and music are more discontinuous than philosophy and politics. Why was the question raised about the German bishops, i.e., about religion and politics? In other words—I don't know if I'm making myself clear—I'm having trouble with where the conversation is situated. Are these simply different hats, or is religion in a bishop, or music if one happens to be a musician; is a philosopher's philosophy able to operate on a separate plane from one's political convictions, especially when those political convictions have obvious social implications that are being felt all around one?

SLUGA: I certainly don't like talking about different hats; that's much too simple a picture. That suggests totally unrelated kinds of belief systems. That's not what I'm after. Let me put it this way: in some sense there is no logic that holds propositions together. A better way to put that would be to say that there is no simple, neutral logic that holds them together.

SCHNEIDERS: But are they held together by logic or are they held together by something much deeper in the person?

SLUGA: I use the word logic here in order to indicate some system—it needn't be logic in that narrow technical sense—some system that connects and relates them together. One can't give a single answer to the question: what holds it together? I have worried not about music and politics; I have worried about mathematics and politics. There were people who

tried to push something called German mathematics. I have done some research on Gottlob Frege, an important figure in foundational studies in mathematics. He died in 1925, but late in life wrote some political diaries which showed that he veered to the right. In fact, he associated himself with a right-wing philosophical group. The question, of course, arises: what is the possible linkage here between this work and his politics? Maybe one can trace something here, but again one would have to define exactly the nature of the linkage. Clearly you can't derive political conclusions from Frege's logical axioms, his fundamental laws in arithmetic. But maybe you can see a certain correspondence between styles of thinking. Maybe the idea that there is something called "the ground," "the grounding," which you can only get at by a certain kind of inquiry, which only certain kinds of people are equipped to get at. This idea of "the ground" and somebody able to find that ground is similar to the kind of view that Heidegger takes in his philosophy. Maybe he is also seeing himself as being privileged because he has understood the grounding question of metaphysics which nobody—so far—had understood. Everybody had understood the leading question of metaphysics, namely, what is the nature of beings. And Heidegger takes for himself this privilege that he has finally grasped what is the fundamental—the grounding—question of metaphysics. In his lectures, he begins this discourse with an examination of what that grounding question is—the question of the nature of being itself, and then you find—in that same chapter—the question of Germany being at the heart of Europe, of being surrounded by the two giants, the Soviet Union and the U.S., which are, metaphysically speaking, just the same, and that the world can only be saved by the one primordial nation, the German nation, and it is only through German destiny by which human destiny can be saved. These kinds of excavations are possible in Heidegger's thought precisely because he believes there is something called "the grounding" question. And then there are certain people, namely, himself and then the German philosophers and then maybe the German people as the people who harbor the German philosophers who are privileged to ask these questions and thereby save the nation. Therefore that kind of structure isn't all that different from the structure of foundationalism in mathematics. At some point the thought structures that get you from this event to politics may turn out to be very similar, and they may have a common logic, for all we know.

SCHNEIDERS: Are these thought structures or deep intuitive concerns which lead people to care about things in a certain way, and that intuitive leap then gets articulated in the realm of discourse within which one operates? If that happens to be mathematics, it's going to come out one way; if that happens to be philosophy, it's going to come out another way. And then we come in and say: can you draw inferences from philosophy to politics when in fact the connections were made on another level and—rationalized is perhaps pejorative—articulated in the realm of discourse, that is the realm of discourse of the person in question, whether that happens to be writing music or theoretical mathematics or philosophy. In other words, are we being misled to enter the conversation at the very conscious, articulated level, which, in fact, when connections were made, was not made there at all? In other words, we're defeating something that was not even there.

SLUGA: When you talk about emotional need, what kind of need do you mean?

SCHNEIDERS: I'm suggesting things we most deeply care about and things we have intuitions about. For example, what makes someone say, "Germany is located in the center of the world?" One has to assume a very limited, Western hemisphere type of geography to come up with something like that. But if one is concerned with mediating between two things which seem to be polar opposites but which one perceives to be, in fact, identical—if that is what one is concerned with, then the intuition is that here lies the truth. The intuition is that the real structure of this reality is in fact philosophical. In other words, are those connections made at some much deeper level of the human psyche and then articulated at a level of public discourse where we can start criticizing them? It's much more important to say that the same person said these things, than that this person is capable of using several discrete and disconnected realms of discourse. Maybe it's much more important that the same person said it.

SLUGA: I'm not enough of a psychologist to speak about this question—what his deep needs are. What I see myself doing is to look for the deep effects that might be produced by these needs whatever they might be. One of the effects is this urge to find unity, to define unity, to establish unity, to value unity of thought, of person. Maybe the two go together in some ways—the need to define oneself in some ways as a unified person, the need to value the unity of thought. And then, the question to my mind is, why is this important? Why the difference? Why the difficulty?

WUELLNER: There's a difference between unity and totalization—so it's not just unity versus diversity, but unity in conflict with totalization.

SLUGA: What's the difference?

WUELLNER: You tell me.

SLUGA: Well, I didn't use the word totalization.

WUELLNER: But isn't that what he himself is reacting against? He sees Nazism eventually equated with totalization. Wasn't that in your paper.

DREYFUS: It was in mine. Yes, I think there is a difference between unity and totalization. Thus you can have a view like Heidegger's. There's always some dominant understanding of reality, but that doesn't mean it's the only one and that it's the true one. It only is the shared understanding of what counts among the people who count. But there will be other areas in which people will have other understandings left over from the past in marginal practices—that would be unity without totality. In totalization every aspect of people's lives is taken up. Heidegger resisted that; Foucault resisted that; whereas the Nazis aim at inclusiveness.

COOLIDGE: I think I'm thinking along the same lines as the last two questions indicated. I'd like to get back to the idea of a metadiscourse and what use or need there is for such a concept. We often tend to forget that we know very well that discursive communities are

not hermetically sealed from each other. In fact, the basic definition of them is that they overlap. The reason that they overlap is that their sites overlap, the mathematicians, the biologists, the philosophers, the political practitioners and the political scientists. It's meaningful to say that each is in a thought world by themselves—a discourse community—but they are all living in the same city, or the same country. Some things which impinge on their thoughts, they share. If there's inflation, they all feel the anxieties, they all respond. That's part of what we mean when we say they overlap. I'm wondering whether we might make use of yet another metaphor—that of the ecosystem, in which any change, any insult, to the system will be responded to in ways that are determined by the organisms, by the internal structure of the organisms which make up the ecosystem. And at the same time they are responding to each other as well as to this new factor. So that there would be a sameness but at the same time a real difference throughout the system. When we speak of metadiscourse, are we really asking for a theory, or an explanation which would get outside the whole system of discourses and spot the factors of objective reality that are being responded to in their different ways by these different discourses? If that's the case, do we really need the idea of another discourse—which in a sense is "meta"—at all?

SLUGA: Let me respond by saying a word about Habermas here since we really haven't talked about him so far. I think he makes a very profound observation about Heidegger's development by saying that—I may disagree with some of the details, but I think the basic issue is correct—saying that Heidegger even before 1933 had political views that were quite reactionary. Habermas called them revolutionary. Hugo Ott has shown that Heidegger came out of a very reactionary kind of Catholicism and that this indeed may have influenced his whole political outlook right from the start. Habermas says that Heidegger essentially already had the political means that were necessary for his approval of Nazism in 1933. They were nevertheless in some sense outside his philosophy until 1933, and then they invaded the heart of Heidegger's philosophizing. I think that here is a correct observation that in this case as in many others a philosopher can have a whole range of unrelated beliefs. At a certain point these unrelated beliefs may become related to each other in certain ways. The question then is, what happened at this point? We say first that these beliefs are external to his philosophy, and then they become internal—this isn't enough. We need to question ourselves on what makes a thought internal and what makes it external to some other thought? It's surely not logical consequence in any straight-forward sense, but then what is it? I want to say that it simply cannot be or ought not to be the unity of a person or emotional needs. All of these may point to a common focus or problem, but the problem is still to define precisely how thoughts get linked and disconnected. I made a suggestion that in this case—maybe in all cases—one can never effect the linkage by a direct transition. But the transition has to be always indirect in terms of a philosophical, metaphysical plane; and then there must be some thesis that philosophers have about themselves as philosophers and then the nature of the claim and then recognizing those claims and so on, which will allow the transition. Plato has exemplified that structure of argument. His theory of resemblance is in fact a theory that allows these transitions from one plane to another. But I could imagine someone with a Platonic philosophical metaphysics who doesn't believe in resemblance at all because the temporal world is necessarily the other of the metaphysical world. You might think of the temporal world in

purely pragmatic terms because you can't apply these metaphysical concepts to it. And hence, none of the structures that you find in metaphysical reality need be projected into the political realm. But that's not how Plato made that move. He made it by resemblance, similarity. I think it's always by some system of analogy that you get from one plane to another.

ALPERS: I have a question I want to put in general and then in specific form. The general form is simply how historical is this inquiry of yours? And the specific form is to ask you how important—dare I say essential?—was formulating the problem in terms of the case of Heidegger and his Nazism?

SLUGA: I work differently from most of my colleagues. Most philosophers seem, to me, people who grasp a very general idea, and they look around for illustrations, maybe in the external world. I am an inductive philosopher. I get fascinated by phenomena and then work my way up and end up—if I can—with some general insight. This is how it happened with this paper. When the Farias book came out, I had been thinking about Frege and his right-wing associates and their history and so on. And then I thought, wait a minute, the fact that there were these others around here in this context, that throws some light on the situation in which people are focussed on this one philosopher, Heidegger, in which—particularly in the German context—he serves as a kind of scapegoat. You can forget about the discipline and its problems because we have this convenient person to hang our troubles on. I thought this was interesting, and then I tried to think further from there. Now this paper is the most general product of these reflections.

ALPERS: So it's more a critique of philosophy than an attempt to give an account of a historical situation?

SLUGA: Yes. Maybe now I have to reverse myself and say that maybe I had already set up a general project after all. And it is a critique of philosophy more than anything. Having been exposed to Wittgenstein, I think philosophy is something which needs to be critiqued.

JAY: I wonder if I could put a question to Professor Dreyfus? I was quite struck by an unexpected Habermasian move you made when you talked about Heidegger's philosophy being dangerous. So, first of all, you admit there is a danger in Heidegger's philosophy?

DREYFUS: Yes.

JAY: All right. Then the second Habermasian move is to say that at this point one direction to go would be to try to figure out what criteria one could use in testing a new charismatic leader or movement before giving it our allegiance. That seems to me to be a very Habermasian assumption, and I just wondered if you were intending to go in that direction?

DREYFUS: I was just trying to see where it led, and I was sad to see where I came out. It looks to me like Kierkegaard asking about the suspension of the ethical and then saying, of course, when someone suspends the ethical there are no criteria to see if one is doing this demonically or not. And then he starts giving the criteria anyway: at least you can tell it's not the right kind of suspension of the ethical if this and this . . . So I was thinking that Heidegger, after all, tells us in the *Origin of the Work of Art* that it's not the right kind of charismatic figure if it tries to totalize everything, if it denies there's any truth in the anomalies, if it tries to make everything explicit. Those who try to bring everything under control, you can be sure are not right. And I thought, that's great, Heidegger's trying to come up with criteria for this. And then, of course, I asked why Heidegger chose just the figure who tried to bring everything under control, to totalize it, to deny any truth in the anomalies. And then I saw that one can always think of ways in which one's favorite charismatic figure seems to meet the criteria. I'm sure Heidegger thought that the Nazis showed respect for the earth and weren't trying to totalize everything. Maybe there's something to be said for criteria, however. It seems to me that what happened to Heidegger is that by 1938, he did see—maybe you can only fool yourself so long—that his favorite charismatic figure didn't meet any of his criteria, and he withdrew his support. So what's the moral of this? I guess the moral is that criteria don't keep people from defending Nazis. People can make any criteria fit. Whereas, Habermas seems to think that all one needs are clear, rational, logical criteria and then nobody would fall for such a thing as the Nazis. To sum up: I think Heidegger's a rational man; I think he's got some good criteria—if you must have a charismatic figure, make these restrictions—and he goes for one who doesn't meet his restrictions. That shows how little help it is to have criteria.

JAY: Isn't it a basic contradiction that you can believe charismatically in a leader and then choose to reflect why you believe in him?

DREYFUS: But that's not what he's doing. He's not reflecting on why he believes in him.

JAY: But the criteria requires some sort of sense of reflection. In other words, the charismatic leadership, as I understand it, means that you accept on a kind of intuitive faith rather than rationally reflect on why you accept. The classic example is Jesus asserting, "It is written . . . but I say unto you . . ." In other words, the criteria, the formalized rules are thrown out because *I* say what you should believe. So there are two very different types of belief systems. It seems to me that you can't fit them together; it's an either/or. Either you believe charismatically, and waive criteria, or you reflect.

DREYFUS: That sounds very Habermasian. You're confusing, it seems to me, levels of belief. That is, you've got to believe what the charismatic figure tells you to believe, but that's different from believing that *x* is a charismatic figure. It wouldn't make any sense to say that if it's a charismatic figure, you've got to give up deciding on what counts as a charismatic figure. Of course you've got to decide on what counts as a charismatic figure, and then believe what the figure tells you to believe if he counts as one. I'm saying that Heidegger had criteria for deciding whether Hitler counted as a charismatic figure. And I don't know what it proves; I haven't any philosophical thesis about it. I can only restate

the facts. He had criteria for showing that Hitler didn't count as one, and from 1933 to 1938 he believed that Hitler was one anyway, and then he woke up and said: Hitler doesn't count as one.

WAETJEN: But if thinking's lot is cast by being, and thinking is primal, then how can you have criteria? Because criteria—I thought I just heard—are based on objectification of thought?

DREYFUS: There aren't rational criteria; there are criteria for thinking. The thinker asks: what are the characteristics of a being in the clearing, such that it can stabilize and preserve the ontological structure of the clearing? That's hardly normal philosophical, rational thought; that's "Heidegger thinking" talk. It isn't trying to submit thinking or being to criteria grounded in anything else—like the structure of practical reason or the structure of communicative competence. It's just the criteria that thinking comes up with out of its thinking.

JAY: Then you use the word *testing* here. Maybe that's what put me off. Is testing a part of thinking?

DREYFUS: A thinker has to test his time to see if it's realistic. Maybe test isn't the right word. For example, Heidegger's got to constantly ask himself the question: is the translation of Greek into Latin philosophy a loss or a gain in ontological profundity? He asks himself that question; he comes up with an answer. Wouldn't it be all right to say that he's testing the Roman ontology vis-a-vis the Greek? Or does that sound too rational?

JAY: When I heard testing, I heard validity testing.

DREYFUS: Well, I didn't mean it that way.

KNAPP: It seemed to me that when Professor Jay was asking about the response, one assertion that stood out was: "his philosophy is dangerous." I was surprised to see Professor Sluga nod at the point at which this was said. And now, I'm not so sure I understand why Professor Dreyfus thinks philosophy is dangerous. It sounds like philosophy isn't dangerous. It sounds like what is dangerous is the human tendency to forget the philosophy at some point. The philosophy contains these criteria, one applies the criteria inappropriately and therefore makes the wrong choice. So the philosophy itself isn't dangerous.

DREYFUS: Could I say one word? It's already dangerous, though, to believe you need a charismatic figure. This is what I meant here. And once you believe that, the risks of screwing up are great and the results are horrendous.

KNAPP: That's how I understood the response in the first place. But then I'm still puzzled about Professor Sluga's nodding at that point because that's too much of a logical premise. It's dangerous because charismatic figures frequently turn out to be destructive lunatics, and

that's where the danger lies, and therefore you've got a philosophy with that potentiality: it's a good chance it will turn out the way it turned out. And that sounds like a kind of meta-language account of how you get from Heidegger's philosophy to Nazism. All you have to fill in is the further theory that it's the various factors in his background that lead him to make this particular mistaken application of his theory. But that *cannot* be what Professor Sluga is talking about, because that suggests that there is a logically intrinsic danger in this philosophical position. Everything that you've been saying is that you can't make that connection.

JARRETT: Professor Sluga, it looks like there's a danger in your nod.

SLUGA: I think he interpreted my nod differently. I didn't mean to agree with the content of Professor Dreyfus's statement. I'm perfectly happy to say that a certain way of thinking is dangerous in a sense that it often has, and is likely to have, such and such consequences. But then I want to know more about what makes it dangerous. Why is this kind of thinking dangerous? I don't believe that actions are ever logical consequences of words. It's not the case that people believe in a certain philosophy and then engage in a certain action, that the action can be called a logical consequence of the words. The question is what kind of a relation is there. I suggested an example when I mentioned resemblance as the mediating idea between the political and the metaphysical realm. In the case of Heidegger it's something else. I think it's really much more the idea of the true ground which is hidden and can be found by those privileged—German philosophers, Heidegger, the Greeks, and so on. This way of thinking allows in moments of political crisis when you think it really now matters that you find out what the ground, the really fundamental questions are certain kinds of political consequences.

KNAPP: Why hasn't that turned into what the critics of Heidegger's philosophy once claimed? If you've got this kind of investment in this particular person, and you're living in a society where this monstrous option is available, there's a good chance you'll opt for that monstrous option. That strikes me as a very straightforward combination of logical and psychological explanation for how you get from Heideggerian philosophy to Nazism. I took it that you were suggesting that question wasn't all that interesting. That was what Professor Dreyfus was suggesting—that you can sort out the personal from the philosophical without losing sense of the philosophy's danger, which is an intrinsic thing. It's a logical feature of the philosophy that it says that one of the things to be desired is a charismatic, salvific figure, and that combined in a straightforward way with a certain psychological history leads to a mistaken choice. It sounds to me like you've got a foundation of logic there.

SLUGA: I don't want to be psychological at all! I'm not concerned with psychological mechanisms. The question is: whatever they may be, how do they manifest themselves at the level of the ways we talk, in discourse? In the case of Heidegger, I'm suggesting an analogy between the Nazi's concern with *Blut und Boden* and Heidegger's concern with ground. Finally when after the war, in *Der Satz von Grund*, we are told that *Grund* doesn't only mean essence in the philosophical sense but also *Wiesengrund*, ground in the sense of

the soil we stand on: Heidegger is finally spelling out for us what the logic of his political, philosophical discourse was. All the time I'm not saying there's never a psychological linkage. There are psychological linkages but that's not what I'm talking about. What I am saying is that there is never a question of logical consequence. But you might say in today's popular language that it's always a metaphorical, an analogical relation, and what needs to be spelled out in each case is the nature of the metaphor that gets us from one place to another. But of course even when that gets spelled out, this metaphor in this case managed to make the transition from the one to the other, that raises the question: isn't it explained by the metaphor itself? At least you have now given an account that connects the two levels of speaking with each other.

KNAPP: The metaphor is dangerous and the psychology makes a mistake.

DREYFUS: This story about ground seems to me to prove too much. Frege was looking for ground; Heidegger raised the question of ground; Russell was trying to ground things in sense data, and so were the positivists. In fact every philosopher since Plato is implicated. So seeking ground cancels out, unless you want to take the line that philosophy is fascist from the start.

SLUGA: There is that point—yes. I'm not altogether unhappy with that! I don't agree, however, that this idea of grounding is pervasive. I don't think it's present in all philosophy. In some sense, positivism is an anti-grounding philosophy.

DREYFUS: Descartes is going to turn out to be a fanatical, dangerous proto-Nazi—he's a ground freak!

SLUGA: In the case of Descartes we have a wonderful illustration of my point, because in the *Discourse on Method*, Descartes accompanies the exposition of his foundational methodology by two applications. One of them is in the area of aesthetics where it is clear to him that a city or building designed by a single builder is clearly preferable to one in which many hands have worked historically. And secondly, he says clearly that the state of Sparta, where all the laws come from a single ruler, is in many ways preferable to a state in which many people have a voice in making laws, because all the laws cohere. So Descartes, I think, was an advocate of absolute monarchy without a doubt. He didn't say much about politics, but where he does talk about politics, it's precisely on the analog of his philosophical structure.

SCHNEIDERS: You said a few minutes ago that you weren't interested in the psychological but I think that precisely the category of metaphor is a help to bridge the gaps between the psychological and the purely speculative in terms of discourse. If one says that Heidegger was already involved in the reactionary, the extremely conservative right-wing, psychologically and probably religiously, I think you could say, in terms of his own authoritarian personality or at least his tendencies in that direction, that that was already in place and that here was someone interested in the ultimate questions, in what things really mean, and in the architecture of thought that could account for everything. It seems to me that one

has to integrate that kind of personal experience, personal orientation, into that process in one way or another if one is not going to be fractured as a thinker and as a person. Whether one does this, i.e., explains this by resemblance or explains it by polarity, it seems to me it's basically the same operation, because polarity is also a way of putting the whole thing together. But the drive is to put the whole thing together, so that what one is fundamentally about personally, politically, religiously, psychologically and so on, fits into what one thinks about the whole of reality. To me, that's exactly where metaphor functions to construct models which play on several different levels.

SLUGA: First, maybe one needs to distinguish between the reality of personal unities, unity of person, and the myth of the unity of the person. We do believe that we are one and the same, and still we talk in those different voices in public and private discourse, and nevertheless we operate on this idea, that although we don't quite know how, nevertheless these are the voices of the same person. To some extent I believe that the myth of the unity of the person is itself a product of this pursuit of unity of thought which motivates much of our philosophizing. The question is why. To get to your other question: I haven't used the notions of metaphors, analogies, so far. I think those terms themselves are metaphorical in certain ways. All they really mark is that a thought is transitional—there is a transition from one thought to another. This suggests to us that because they are all metaphysical, analogical transitions, that in some sense the quality of the transition is the same, and my concern is to show that they are different. One needs to speak more precisely about the nature of the transitions in each case.

SCHNEIDERS: One might say that they are, in fact, discontinuous, and therefore the conclusions the person is coming up with are erroneous, even though one might have criteria to keep one from making those erroneous connections. But it is precisely by that method of thinking or combination of thinking and feeling that one gets from A to B even if from the standpoint of logic, the conclusions are incorrect.

SLUGA: Yes, but I'm just drawing away from the psychological, causal language, not because this isn't a legitimate field of investigation, but I really don't know what to say here. I feel that most people operate with an idea of causality in human behavior which is not feasible. I keep going back to the statement of Konrad Lorenz that history and historical processes are a cloth of felt. They are not a woven fabric in which you can follow the threads, but they form such a complex pattern that we don't know anymore how to untangle them. I hear that we can causally trace back people's behavior to this or that belief, and that belief to something else, and so on, and this is just a gross oversimplification.

WUELLNER: That causal connection or that logical connection appeared as a question several times in the argument of your paper. Has anyone ever looked at the rhetorical dimension in Heidegger? The only work I know is by Massimo Marassi, "The Hermeneutics of Rhetoric in Heidegger," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 19:2(1986)79-98. I am thinking not just in the poetic part but the rhetorical, so that the connection of thought and *how* that is made, including the use of metaphor, is looked at from the rhetorical, persuasive perspective. Thus the craft of thinking is not the craft of the logical connection nor just the

craft of the poetic and metaphoric where Heidegger and Plato come together, but something that is more politically engaged, argumentatively engaged.

SLUGA: As far as I know, nobody has really undertaken this task, and what is interesting to my mind is that in the first of Habermas's essays from 1953, he raises that problem of the rhetoric of Heidegger's language. Of course, it's a very short piece, and he only wants to bring it up as an issue. Here certainly is an area of investigation in which one should know not only to whom one is speaking, but what the rhetorical philosophy is. Is he speaking in plain assertions, are there argumentative structures, and so on. One should also look at the choice of language. I tried to talk about the bewitching power of Heidegger's language. When I was a student and first exposed to Heidegger, I certainly felt dismayed about the extent to which my fellow students fell in with his language—its power and attraction. In six weeks they were all pure Heideggerians. There's a power in this. He wants to purify the language and go back to German roots.

KNAPP: I have a question that may take a short answer. I'm trying to get a sense of what belongs to this meta-language. If we argue that, in some sense, it's fair to say, as Professor Dreyfus says in his response, that Heidegger made a mistake in choosing to endorse Nazism, to which discourse does that statement belong? Is that a statement that we make within the discourse of philosophy? Do we say it's a philosophical mistake, because he should have seen philosophically that his philosophy didn't lead in this direction? That's what I take to be Professor Dreyfus's argument. Did he make a political mistake? In other words, we can't ask the question in philosophical terms, because logical consequence doesn't work that way; but we can ask if he made a political mistake. But it does not make sense to say that he made a philosophical mistake. Or is it that he neither made a mistake in terms of political discourse nor in terms of philosophical discourse, but in terms of our metadiscursive perspective we see that he made a mistake? I think I'd have a clearer sense of the role of the meta-language if I understand where the judgment lies.

SLUGA: This is a kind of hypothetical question and the problem is that Heidegger, of course, somewhat changed his politics at least in this period. He did also change his philosophy quite a bit, and I think that he did also change his, what I call, metadiscursive understanding of himself—the role of philosophy and thinking. In all three respects, there was change. And then the question, the mistake he sees ultimately affecting all three things . . . It wasn't just a little slip of the tongue which occurred, but something deeper—namely a redirecting of a whole set of ideas on all these different levels. But then to ask the question which comes first—I don't know.

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